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Non-technical Summary
With low competition banks are slow to pass declining market rates through to
debtors. With high competition banks are forced to react in a faster way – otherwise
they risk to lose market shares. Since integration of the EU markets for financial
services intensifies competition it should, therefore, also speed up pass-through of
interest rate changes.
Based on this consideration it is the objective of this study to quantify the potential
benefits from further integration by focusing on interest rate pass-through. The
quantification of benefits follows a straightforward strategy. If borders played no
role for EU credit markets significant national differences in adjustment speed
between market and retail rates should vanish. Thus, perfect integration would imply
convergence of pass-through speed between national markets. In our study we work
with the assumption that pass-through speed converges to the level of the national
market that is adjusting fastest today. This assumption allows to simulate retail
interest rates for different countries and to compare these simulated with actual
series. This comparison is the base for our suggested new indicator of integration
benefits.
The results of this simulation show that based on the experience from the second
half of the nineties debtors in some countries could have gained substantial interest
rate savings in periods of rate declines. Since the pass-through is asymmetric – i.e. it
is faster if this is for the bank’s advantage – this also indicates a net consumer gain
over the whole interest rate cycle. The findings on heterogeneous pass-through also
support the view that today retail financial markets are much less integrated in
Europe than many indicators based on capital market links seem to suggest. Thus,
the pass-through indicator is a helpful corrective to the wholesale oriented
integration indicators that regularly hint on high integration of EU financial markets.
The insights about the determinants of pass-through speed show the way for
reducing these customer disadvantages. The Euro and the resulting convergence of
money markets and financial structure will work towards convergence of pass-
through speed. A more reliable and probably faster mechanism would be activated if
direct cross-border retail credits become more important. This kind of cross-border
activity could set in motion an arbitrage mechanism that should force banks to speed
up interest rate adjustments for the benefit of debtors and depositors.
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Abstract
Lending and borrowing interest rates are often slow to adjust to changing capital
market conditions. This paper argues that national differences of the pass-through
speed in the EU can be regarded as a retail-oriented indicator of financial
integration. Based on an ECB database the speed of interest rate adjustments for
different markets and countries is measured - showing a considerable fragmentation
of markets. Simulations show how much consumers in some countries could gain
from a convergence of adjustment speed on the fastest levels.
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11 Introduction
Competition benefits consumers in many ways. On credit markets, benefits arise
from the speed of interest rate adjustment. With low competition banks are slow to
pass declining market rates through to debtors. With high competition banks are
forced to react in a faster way – otherwise they risk to lose market shares. Since
integration of the EU markets for financial services intensifies competition it should,
therefore, also speed up pass-through of interest rate changes.
Based on this consideration it is the objective of this study to quantify the potential
benefits from further integration by focusing on interest rate pass-through. The link
between market and lending interest rate has extensively been studied for monetary
policy purposes (see survey below). However, to the authors’ knowledge this study
is the first to use it to develop benefit indicators for further financial retail market
integration.
The quantification of benefits follows a straightforward strategy. If borders played
no role for EU credit markets significant national differences in adjustment speed
between market and retail rates should vanish. Thus, perfect integration would imply
convergence of pass-through speed between national markets. Of course, no one can
forecast exactly to which level this convergence would lead. In our study we work
with the assumption that pass-through speed converges to the level of the national
market that is adjusting fastest today. This assumption allows to simulate retail
interest rates for different countries and to compare these simulated with actual
series. This comparison is the base for our suggested new indicator of integration
benefits.
This indicator extends the literature on financial market integration which suffers
from its wholesale perspective: Wholesale oriented indicators often hint at a high
level of integration of the EU financial market. This result is in sharp contrast to the
obvious incomplete integration of retail markets. Since our indicator is based on a
central  price indicator of European retail financial markets – retail lending rates – it
should help to get a more complete picture of the degree of integration.
Indeed it can be shown that based on the experience from the second half of the
nineties debtors in some countries could have gained substantial interest rate savings
in periods of rate declines. Since the pass-through is asymmetric – i.e. it is faster if
this is for the bank’s advantage – this also indicates a net consumer gain over the
whole interest rate cycle. The findings on heterogeneous pass-through also support
the view that today retail financial markets are much less integrated in Europe than
many indicators based on capital market links seem to suggest.
The analysis proceeds the following way. In section 2, the pass-through literature is
surveyed, followed by a discussion of the relationship between market integration
and interest rate adjustment. After the presentation of some descriptive results
(section 3) the core quantitative part follows in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
22 The concept of interest rate pass-through in monetary and
integration economics
2.1 Short- and long-run links
The main objective of the existing interest rate pass-through literature is a better
understanding of a central bank’s interest rate policy. This literature’s focus is the
response of bank lending rates to changes in the money market rate which is an
important part of the monetary transmission mechanism. Two groups of studies can
be distinguished insofar the possible long-run relationship (cointegration) between
lending and money market rate is taken into account or not.
Studies with a short-run focus
Studies with a main focus on the short-run link between money market and lending
rates (e.g. Borio/Fritz, 1995, Cottarelli/Kourtelis, 1994, and Donney/Degryse, 2001)
usually employ the following autoregressive distributed lag model for lending rates:
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Where tL  and tM are lending rate and money market rate at time t, respectively. k is
defined as the model’s optimal lag-length and t  is an error term. The coefficient 0
measures the short-run or impact effect of changes in the money market rates on
lending rates. A value of 0  of less than one displays lending rate stickiness, i.e.
sluggish adjustment of lending rates to money market rates. Equation (1) has to be
estimated in differences if the interest rate series exhibit unit roots in order to avoid
spurious results.
Studies taking account of the long-run link
Equation (1) implies that a long-run link between money market and lending rate
can be calculated as
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thus, in the long-run equation (1) becomes
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3Equation (3) states the cointegration equation, i.e. the long-run relationship between
the lending rate and the money market rate. This long-run relationship can be
incorporated in the model. By doing so, one gets the following error correction
specification:
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Where   is the first difference operator. According to equation (4) changes in the
lending rate, over time, are due to two sources. First, with a lag, changes in the
lending rate are due to changes in the money market rate. Second, they are due to
deviations from the long-run relationship. Moazzami (1999), Sander/Kleimeier
(2001) and Mojon (2000) follow this road.
By estimating equation (4) the short-term impact multiplier as well as the long-run
multiplier and its standard error can directly be obtained. Estimation of equation (4)
is computationally more efficient compared to estimation of the standard pass-
through model (Moazzami, 1999). Therefore, if cointegration between the money
market rate and the lending rate is present, estimating the error correction
specification is preferable.
2.2 Main findings
In general, pass-through studies display three major results.1 First, the short-run
impact multiplier typically is below one, indicating that lending interest rates adjust
sluggish to money market rates. Second, they find significant asymmetry in the
stickiness of upward and downward movements of retail rates. Finally, there are
considerable differences in pass-through coefficients and speed of adjustments
across countries.
Sluggish adjustment
A bank will only adjust its rate when the optimal rate differs by such an amount
from the existing rate that the revenues from changing the rate exceed the costs of
change. Such costs may arise from different sources which leads to several
explanations as to why retail interest rates are sticky (Nabar et al., 1993):
- Asymmetric information between banks and borrowers can lead to adverse
selection and moral hazard. In this case an optimal interest rate exists that
maximises a bank’s expected return on loans. Borrowers accepting a higher rate
than this optimal rate are likely to be poorer than average credit risks and existing
borrowers are likely to choose riskier projects when facing such a higher rate.
                                          
1 See appendix 1 for a summary of results.
4This explains that an increase in loan rates above this optimal rate may actually
reduce the bank’s expected return.
- There are “menu costs” that may prevent banks from adjusting retail rates
instantly. These administrative costs may involve, for example, labour,
computing and notification costs.
- Banks may be interested in long-term relationships with their customers and as a
consequence change loan rates upward less often than justified by the movement
in the underlying cost of funds. Banks and customers have an implicit risk-
sharing arrangement that includes that banks keep retail interest rates more fixed
than the money market rate. In return, bank customers are willing to pay a mark-
up for this insurance.
- Banks can react to a change in money market rate not only by changing the
interest rate. The true loan price can adjust along other dimensions such as
collateral, commitment and fees.
- Rate stickiness can result from the fact that the retail interest rates have a longer
maturity than the money market rate. Banks will not adjust their rates instantly
when there is uncertainty about the future development of market rates.2
- A lack of competition among banks or between banking finance and direct
finance such as commercial papers may lead to sluggish adjustment of retail
rates. Banks in concentrated markets are able to increase their profit margin by
postponing a decrease in rates. In this context the cost of lowering rates would be
the foregone monopoly rent – an opportunity cost.
Asymmetry in the stickiness
There are a number of studies that find significant asymmetry in the stickiness of
upward and downward movements of retail rates (e.g. Mester/Saunders, 1995, and
Mojon, 2000). The pass-through to credit rates is higher in periods of increasing
money market rates than in periods of decreasing market rates. The opposite holds
true for deposit rates.
Consumers face costs of switching banks. This reduces the interest rate elasticity of
the credit demand curve and the deposit supply curve. Thus, the maximisation of
banks’ income may result in this asymmetric pass-through.
Besides, when concentration in the banking market is lower this interest rate cycle
asymmetry of the pass-through is less pronounced (Hannan/Berger 1991,
Neumark/Sharpe 1992).
                                          
2 However, this point is of no relevance in our case, since we take long-term market rates as costs
of fund for long-term retail rates, see section 2.4.
5Heterogeneity in the pass-through across countries
As appendix 1 reveals there are also substantial differences in the pass-through
across countries. Mojon (2000) undertakes a number of regressions in order to
analyse which observable features of the institutional and financial structure can
explain these differences across countries.3 His findings reveal the following: The
volatility of the money market rate as a feature of the monetary policy regime has a
negative effect on the pass-through to credit rates. Obviously, changes in the money
market rate are more likely to be passed through to retail rates if they are perceived
to be permanent. In contrast, like with nominal prices, the pass-through to lending
rates is higher when inflation is high.
Both competition among banks and from direct finance affect the pass-through
significantly. The competition intensity among banks leads to faster adjustment of
credit rates when the market rate is falling and of deposit rates when the market rate
is rising. As an indicator for the competition from direct finance, the volume of
short-term securities – that can also be seen as a substitute to traditional bank
deposits – has a positive impact on the pass-through, i.e. competition from direct
finance increases the speed of adjustment.
Finally, higher staff costs, which are taken as an indicator for the rigidity of bank
costs lead to a smaller degree of pass-through to credit rates.
2.3 Pass-through and financial market integration
As explained above national differences in pass-through speed are caused by a
multitude of factors. Nevertheless, an unequivocal statement about the impact of
market integration on the link between market and lending rates is possible:
integration fosters convergence of pass-through speed between national markets.
Reasons to expect this link between market integration and pass-through are the
following:
- A fully integrated money market - as it is now given for the countries of the
Eurozone - implies a single level of volatility of money market rates.
Furthermore, an integrated financial market fosters diversification of credit risk
across corporate sector issuers of debt securities. As a consequence, also smaller
companies will have access to direct finance. Therefore, with market rate
                                          
3 Mojon (2000) performs a panel regression for the countries in the Euro area. A similar approach
was undertaken, for example, by Cottarelli/Kourelis (1994), that tested the impact of banking
market structure on a cross-section of pass-through elasticities estimated for 31 countries. They
found the following indicators of financial structure to significantly lower the speed of
adjustment of bank rates to money market rates: the absence of money market for negotiable
short-term instruments, relatively high volatility of the money market rate, restrictions of
international capital flows, the existence of barriers to entry, and public ownership of the
banking system.
6volatility and availability of direct finance relevant determinants of pass-through
speed are equalised (Mojon, 2000).
- Full integration of financial markets implies that consumers chose among credit
offers without paying interest to the domicile of a bank. If integration is that far
advanced different pass-through speeds are eliminated directly through debtors’
arbitrage: In a time of falling market rates, potential debtors would shop around
all over Europe and chose the credit offers of fastest adjusting banks. In times of
rising rates a bank moving ahead with lending rate adjustment immediately loses
attraction.
This relationship between integration and pass-through speed allows to use the
concept originating from the monetary transmission literature for different analytical
purposes in the context of integration economics.
First, national differences in pass-through speed can serve as an indicator of
integration. This usefulness is derived from the fact that full integration of financial
markets is a sufficient (but not necessary condition) for convergence of pass-through
speed. The only paper known to the authors using the pass-through approach in this
respect is Sander/Kleimeier (2001). Second, national differences in pass-through
speed can lay the base for the calculation of indicators of integration benefits. This
idea will be developed up to a first quantification in the empirical part of the paper.
The following consideration shows that consumers benefit from a convergence of
interest rate adjustment speed. Debtors in countries with banks that – before
integration - adjust slowly would gain from integration in periods of decreasing
market rates since the credit rate would be lowered earlier than with fragmented
markets. Of course, the same debtors might loose in periods of increasing market
rates. However, as discussed above there is asymmetry in the stickiness of retail
rates observable. The pass-through to credit rates is higher in periods of increasing
money market rates than in periods of decreasing market rates. Thus, over the whole
interest rate cycle, debtors in today’s slow adjusting markets would gain from more
integration. An analogous argument applies to creditors of bank deposits. These
would gain from a faster correction of deposit rates.
The extent of benefits depends on the level to which adjustment speed converges. In
the following, convergence to the top is assumed. It can be regarded as likely that
the degree of competition in a unified EU financial market will exceed the present
national levels of competitive pressure. One could therefore even assume that the
adjustment speed will exceed the degree of today’s fastest adjusters. In this sense the
assumption of convergence to the top is conservative.
2.4 Methodological consequences
The insights of the existing pass-through literature demands a careful specification
of the quantitative analysis in regard to the asymmetry of adjustment and the
possible long-run restriction.
7Since banks react differently in times of increasing and falling interest rates this has
to be taken into account for the regressions. Since we focus on potential benefits of
debtors in periods of falling market rates, the estimation of the pass-through process
must also be based on a period of mainly falling rates. This is the reason that we
restrict the estimation base to the second half of the nineties where we are in the
comfortable position that interest rates more or less constantly fell over a period of
some years.
Furthermore, we follow the more advanced studies and account for a possible long-
run link between costs of funds and lending rates. This is also necessary since we
link interest rate pass-through with financial market integration which clearly
requires also a long-run perspective. Our starting point is the approach undertaken,
for example, by Mojon (2000). First, the error correction model of equation (4) is
estimated provided that the costs of funds variable and the retail bank rate are
cointegrated. In the case that the series are not co-integrated the error correction
term is dropped from the equation and we come back to the standard pass-through
model of equation (1) that is estimated in differences to avoid spurious regression
problems due to the non-stationarity of interest rates.
While these first steps are more or less standard, the specific integration focus
demands qualifications to the approaches of the monetary transmission literature.
One difference concerns the choice of the market interest rate. In the monetary
literature, money market or central bank rates are always used as cost of funds
variables – even if the pass-through to long-run fixed rate credits is studied. Thus,
the analysed adjustment effectively mixes up two different reactions: first the term-
structure reaction of long to short term interest rates and second the reaction of retail
lending to market interest rates. This approach is legitimate for this strand of
literature which is exclusively interested in the effects of monetary policy. This
paper, however, with its interest shifted to financial market integration has to be
more precise. It has to disentangle the term structure link from the intermediation
link. For this purpose, market rates are chosen corresponding to the maturity of the
interest rate agreement. For mortgage lending rates, long-term government bond
yields are used instead of money market rates as a basis for the pass-through
analysis.
The analysis then enters completely new terrain by developing integration benefit
indicators based on the pass-through concept. To reach this objective, we simulate
development of retail lending rates in different markets assuming these markets were
characterised by the pass-through speed of a fast adjuster. Potential interest rate
savings are calculated for the falling market rate period in the second half of the
nineties.
83 Data and descriptive analysis
The analysis is based on monthly data from the ECB data base “National Retail
Interest Rates”.4 The ECB regards the rates included as the “main indicators of retail
financial market conditions in the Member State concerned” (ECB, 2001). National
series are summarised under common headings but are not fully harmonised. This
means that underlying credits might be different between member states in regard to
average size, default risk and other characteristics. Therefore, differences in levels
between member states can not be directly interpreted – which is a less serious
problem for this paper’s approach since it exploits only the link between market and
retail rates within a country. The descriptive analysis is based on three lending rates
and two deposit rates: mortgage loans to households (“N2” in ECB data base),
consumer loans to households (“N3”), short term loans to enterprises (“N4”), time
deposits (“N8”) and savings accounts (“N9”). The econometric analysis will focus
exclusively on credit rates due to lacking data availability for deposit rates.
As explained in the preceding section, market rates are chosen corresponding to the
maturity of the credit and deposit products. The 3-months money market rates from
IMF’s International Financial Statistics are used for all variable interest rate credits
and deposits. For fixed rate products (most of the mortgage interest rates in the ECB
data base refer to fixed rates) government bond yields, again from IMF’s
International Financial Statistics, serve as the market reference rate.
A first descriptive approach should make a difference between periods of increasing
and falling interest rates since an asymmetric pass-through belongs to the well
established empirical facts. Based on development of average market interest rates
(figure 1) the following periods are chosen for calculations of simple correlations
(tables 1-5): 1995:03 – 1999:01 as a period of declining bond yields, 1999:01 -
2000:01 as a period of increasing bond yields, 1995:03 – 1999:05 as a period of
declining money market rates and 1999:05-2000:10 as a period of increasing money
market rates.
                                          
4 These data can be downloaded from www.ecb.int (Statistics).
9Figure 1: Average money market rates and government bond yields
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Table 1: Correlation coefficients mortgage loan rates and government bond
yields
Country 95:03-99:01
decreasing bond
yields
99:01 00:01
increasing bond
yields
Belgium 0.882 0.923
Germany 0.987 0.988
Greece - -0.296
Spain 0.978 -0.200
Italy 0.928 -0.588
Netherlands 0.921 0.864
Austria 0.929 -0.091
Portugal 0.910 -0.524
Finland 0.926 0.308
Great Britain 0.934 0.928
Ireland* 0.843 -0.702
Average 0.924 0.146
*Mortgage credits for Ireland included in the ECB data base are floating, therefore correlation with
money market rate.
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Table 2: Correlation coefficients consumer loans and money market rates
Country 95:03-99:10
decreasing money
market rates
99:10-00:10
increasing money
market rates
Belgium 0.821 0.958
Germany 0.751 0.923
Greece -0.108 0.897
Spain 0.981 0.913
Austria 0.798 0.976
Portugal 0.930 0.218
Finland 0.919 0.983
Great Britain 0.130 0.266
Average 0.653 0.767
Table 3: Correlation coefficients short-term enterprise loans and money
market rates
Country 95:01-99:07
decreasing money
market rates
99:07-00:10
increasing money
market rates
Belgium 0.980 0.993
Germany 0.861 0.958
Greece 0.406 0.966
Spain 0.990 0.921
France 0.704 0.941
Ireland 0.941 0.953
Italy 0.976 0.952
Netherlands 0.896 0.968
Austria 0.763 0.981
Portugal 0.984 0.710
Average 0.850 0.934
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Table 4: Correlation coefficients time deposit rates and money market rates
Country 95:01-99:07
decreasing money
market rates
99:07-00:10
increasing money
market rates
Belgium 0.994 0.998
Germany 0.968 0.985
Greece 0.361 0.951
Spain 0.995 0.986
France 0.993 0.993
Italy 0.978 0.976
Netherlands 0.892 0.983
Austria 0.766 0.939
Portugal 0.991 0.951
Finland 0.829 -0.889
Great Britain 0.928 0.873
Average 0.881 0.795
Table 5: Correlation coefficients savings accounts rates and money market
rates
Country 95:01-99:07
decreasing money
market rates
99:07-00:10
increasing money
market rates
Belgium 0.882 0.416
Germany 0.911 0.974
Greece 0.297 0.957
France 0.845 0.179
Ireland 0.840 0.938
Great Britain 0.873 0.856
Average 0.775 0.720
Some of the correlation coefficients have to be treated with caution. This holds
particularly for the period of increasing rates in 1999 which suffers from its short
time-span and possible distortions through transitory EMU effects on the underlying
interest rate series. Particularly the mortgage rate correlation coefficients for the
increasing interest rate period seem to be affected resulting in implausible negative
signs.
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Nevertheless, the following stylised facts emerge: The pass-through of changing
market rates to retail rates is relatively slow for consumer credits and savings
accounts. The adjustment is faster for mortgages, short-term enterprise credits and
time deposits. Average correlation coefficients support the asymmetry hypothesis
for consumer loans, enterprise loans, time deposits and savings accounts: Here the
adjustment is faster if it benefits the bank: for credits in times of increasing market
rates and for deposits in times of falling market rates.5
As explained above the primary focus of this paper is on differences in pass-through
speed between countries. Here the correlation coefficients give only a first rough but
helpful insight – as can be demonstrated by one example: In the falling interest rate
period the correlation analysis indicates for mortgages that Germany is a relatively
fast and Portugal a slowly adjusting market. Figure 2 depicts the time series for
these examples. It shows that market and retail rates in Germany move in a parallel
way while the link is much less pronounced in the Portuguese case. In this falling
market rate period this means that Portuguese debtors benefit less. In order to
quantify these effects, a more precise approach will be employed in the following
section.
Figure 2: Examples of a fast and a slow pass-through in the mortgage market
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5 Note, however, that for time deposits this result depends on the negative correlation coefficient
for Finland.
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4 Adjustment speed and benefits of integration
In order to quantify benefits of a accelerated interest rate pass-through our focus will
be on the period of falling market rates between 1995 and 1999. We try to answer
the following question: How much would have debtors saved in this period if all EU
countries had been characterised by the adjustment speed of the fastest credit
market?
In principle it is possible to pose a similar question for deposit markets and periods
of rising market rates. Unfortunately, there was no period with increasing money
market rates in the nineties lasting much more than a year. Thus, a data base for a
similar analysis for deposit rates is lacking. Therefore, the following analysis is
restricted to the markets for mortgage lending, consumer credits and short-term
enterprise lending.
The econometric approach is based on the estimation of equation (4) and takes
account of the possibility of cointegration between market and retail rates. The
analysis proceeds the following way: In a preparatory step (4.1), standard unit root
and Johansen cointegration tests were executed in order to identify the level of
integration of the time series and the existence of a cointegration relationship
between market and retail interest rates. In a second step (4.2), the speed of pass-
through is measured based on country specific estimations of equation (4). In a third
step (4.3), for each market the model of a fast adjusting market serves as a basis for
the simulation of retail rates in other countries. This allows to calculate an indicator
for integration benefits in terms of potential interest savings through a convergence
in pass-through speed.
4.1 Preparatory diagnosis
Standard unit root tests overwhelmingly indicate that market and retail interest rates
included are first order integrated (results not reported). This finding is in line with
well known time series characteristics of interest rates and allows to test for
cointegration between market and retail interest rates. The Johansen procedure is
applied using as many data points as available for each country retail market
combination, the maximum range is from January 1980 to April 2001. One has to be
aware that these long periods raise the possibility of structural breaks. This danger
has to be traded off against the restricted meaning of cointegration tests for short
periods since cointegration refers to a long-run relationship. Cointegration is
accepted if the trace statistic indicates the existence of a cointegration relationship
with a significance level of at least 5%. The Akaike information criterion is used to
decide optimal lag length in the application of the cointegration test. These
preparatory diagnostics lay the basis for the estimation of country specific pass-
through equations for the different retail rates.
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4.2 Comparing the adjustment speed on the basis of country specific
estimations
The estimation of equation (4) offers the basis for the measurement of adjustment
speed. In the estimation the error correction term is included depending on whether
the cointegration test has indicated a long-run relationship between market and retail
interest rates or not. The length for the inclusion of lagged values of market and
retail rates was again determined on the basis of the Akaike criterion.
Estimation period is identical to the periods with falling interest rates as used in the
descriptive analysis. Although most time series are available starting with the early
eighties the asymmetric nature of the pass-through forces to base the estimation on a
restricted period. Thus for mortgage credit where the bond yield is the relevant cost
of fund variable the estimation period is 1995:03-1999:01. For consumer and
enterprise loans the estimation period is slightly longer 1995:03-1999:10.
Data availability allowed to estimate 23 pass-through equations indicating large
country differences in the adjustment speed (estimation results are summarised in
appendix 2).
In order to make results comparable the estimation results are used for simulating
retail interest rate development for a common scenario – a decrease of market rates
in period zero by one percentage point with no further fluctuations before and after
that date.
For the assessment of reliability of these simulations, one has to be aware of the very
different quality of the underlying regressions. As can be seen from appendix 2,
results for mortgage markets are most satisfying in two respects: Goodness of fit is
high and with one exception (Italy) the resulting pass-through processes are
convergent. The results for consumer credit rates are far less satisfying. Goodness of
fit is low and all processes are non-convergent, i.e. the resulting credit rate does not
converge to a fixed value. The regressions for enterprise credit are again better apart
from three country regressions with instable processes. Therefore, results for the
mortgage market and the enterprise credit market should be taken more seriously
than those for the consumer credit market.
Figure 3 depicts the pass-through to mortgage lending rates over a one year period.
It shows that these retail-rates follow falling costs of funds only sluggish. Even after
six months the pass-through in two thirds of the countries is far from complete.
Differences in speed between countries are most pronounced between two and four
months. Judging on the basis of the three months adjustment, mortgage lenders
benefit fast from falling market rates in Belgium, Germany and Netherlands.
Consumers in the UK, Ireland, Italy and Spain have to be more patient. Adjustment
is slowest in Austria and Portugal.
Table 6 summarises the results of the same analysis for all three credit markets
based on the three months pass-through.
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Figure 3: Pass-through speed for mortgage credit rates (in basis points)
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Table 6: 3-months-decrease of retail rates after a one percentage point fall
in market rates (in basis points)
Country mortgage loans consumer loans
(short-term)
enterprise loans
(short-term)
Austria -14 -60 -44
Belgium -107 -98 -83
France - - -45
Germany -99 23 -13
Ireland -56 - 3
Italy -47 - -167
Netherlands -97 - -62
Portugal -11 -32 -53
Spain -35 -46 -75
UK -62 -73 -
Simulated effect on retail interest rate of a 1 percentage decrease in market rates (=government
bond yields for most mortgage credit series and 3 month money market rate for all other series)
given the estimation of equation (4). Estimation is based on the period of decreasing market rates
1995-1999 as explained in the text. Missings: No estimation and simulation possible due to data
availability.
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National differences in the adjustment speed for consumer loans are also substantial.
While, again, Belgium is a fast adjuster where already after three months consumers
get almost hundred percent of the market rate decline adjustment is not noticeable at
all in Germany and relatively slow in Portugal and Spain. For enterprise credits Italy
is the fastest reacting country according to these results. A particularly slow pass-
through occurs in Greece and Germany.
4.3 Benefits in integration scenarios
In the final step retail rates for EU countries are simulated assuming that the link
between market and retail rates in each country would be as close as in a fast
adjusting country. The choice of the reference country is based on the results of the
three-months pass-through section with some qualifications. Germany is chosen as a
reference country for mortgage credits, although it is second to Belgium in terms of
the 3-month adjustment. The reason is that the underlying regression has a much
better fit for Germany than for Belgium and that the difference in three-month
adjustment speed is only of a minor magnitude (see appendix 2). For consumer
credits Belgium as the fastest adjuster is chosen as reference country. However,
simulation results for consumer credits are less reliable than for mortgage due to the
non-convergence of all estimated pass-through processes.
For short-run enterprise credits Italy appears to be the faster adjuster on the basis of
the three-month pass-through. The choice of Belgium instead of Italy is motivated
by the fact that the underlying estimation of the pass-through process for Italy is
exploding. This would pose serious difficulties for the simulation. The Belgian
regression results indicate a convergent adjustment behaviour making it a better
basis for the simulation.
Figure 4 depicts examples of the simulation results for mortgage credits for two
polar cases: Belgium as a fast adjusting country and Portugal as a slow adjuster. The
figure includes two series, the original and the simulated mortgage interest rate.
Basis for the simulation is the country market rate and the pass-through equation of
the reference country (which is Germany for mortgages).
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Figure 4: Simulation results mortgage rates – two polar examples (in per cent)
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Simulation is based on country market rates and the German pass-through equation estimated on
data from the declining interest rate period 1995:03-1999:01.
As expected simulations come to different results for the relation between simulated
and original series. Debtors in Belgium with its fast pass-through mortgage market
would not benefit from the German link between market and retail rates. The
simulated rate exceeds the original rate for about two thirds of the simulation period.
On average the simulated interest rates are 19 basis points higher than the actual
values. The case is different for the slow pass-through market in Portugal. Here,
consumers would have benefited to a large extent from German pass-through
structures in the second half of the nineties. For most of the time the simulated rates
are substantially below the actual series, on average the interest rate advantage
amounts to 158 basis points for this period of declining market rates.
The same kind of analysis was executed for all three markets and all countries with
sufficient data. Figures 5-7 summarise the outcomes of the simulations. Here, a
negative (positive) value for the difference between the simulated and original series
indicates that a country would benefit (lose) from the structures of the reference
country.
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Figure 5: Average mortgage credit interest rate 1995:03 – 1999:01(in per cent)
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In brackets behind country name in figures 5-7: value of difference between mean original and
simulated series. Reference country for the simulation is Germany.
Figure 6: Average consumer credit interest rate 1995:03 – 1999:10 (in per cent)
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Reference country for the simulation is Belgium.
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Figure 7: Average enterprise credit interest rate 1995:03 – 1999:10 (in per cent)
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Reference country for the simulation is Belgium.
Comparing the winner-loser pattern of these simulations corresponds in most cases
with the results of the three-months pass-through analysis. Relative slow adjusting
countries tend to gain most.
However, there are also contradictions between both approaches, the most striking
concerns the Italian market for enterprise loans. Here Italy shows even an
overcompensating three-months adjustment. Nevertheless enterprise debtors in that
country are identified as a major winner from assuming the Belgian pass-through
speed. Here the simulation can be regarded as dominating the three-months pass-
through result. As already explained above the Italian pass-through regression
implies an instable process and thus has to be treated with caution. The simulation
results for enterprise credit rates are not affected from this problem since they are
only based on the regressions of the stable reference countries. Simulations for
consumer credits are less reliable due to the fact of instable pass-through equations
for all countries including the Belgian reference case.
For mortgage credits the simulations clearly splits countries into two groups. For the
UK, Austria, Netherlands and Belgium on the one hand the pass-through structure of
the German reference case would hardly make a difference. In Italy, Spain, Portugal
and Ireland on the other hand, consumers would have gained much from the pass-
through speed of the German market.
For consumer credits where data availability restricts the inclusion of countries and
where the underlying regressions have less satisfying properties the picture is not as
clear cut between Southern and Middle Europe. Now Portugal belongs together with
Germany to the benefiting countries while Spain forms with Austria a group with no
substantial differences from the Belgian reference case. The UK is in between.
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On the enterprise credit market, creditors in Italy, France and Ireland would benefit
most from a convergence of pass-through speed on the Belgian level. The
Netherlands, Germany and Spain are not very different from the reference case
while Austria and Portugal would even lose.
5 Conclusion
The message of the pass-through related integration indicator is unambiguous. The
substantial reaction differences of national bank retail rates to changes in costs of
funds supports the view that retail credit markets in Europe are still far away from
perfect integration. The pass-through indicator is a helpful corrective to the
wholesale oriented integration indicators that regularly hint on high integration of
EU financial markets.6
The results show that incomplete integration is costly for bank customers – at least
in some EU countries. In the falling interest rate period of the second half of the
nineties, mortgage debtors in Italy, Spain and Portugal paid on average an excess
interest rate of more than 150 basis points due to the particular slow pass-through in
these markets. Because of the asymmetry of the pass-through these losses are not
compensated by equally sized benefits in times of rising interest rates.
The insights about the determinants of pass-through speed show the way for
reducing these customer disadvantages. The Euro and the resulting convergence of
money markets and financial structure will work towards convergence of pass-
through speed. A more reliable and probably faster mechanism would be activated if
direct cross-border retail credits become more important. This kind of cross-border
activity could set in motion an arbitrage mechanism that should force banks to speed
up interest rate adjustments for the benefit of debtors and depositors.
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Appendix 1 – Results of the literature
Pass-through of a 1 percent change in the money market rates to the lending rate
(The coefficients are not directly comparable since the underlying estimation periods
differ)
Country Study Impact
multiplier 0
3-month
interim
multiplier
Long-run
multiplier 
Austria CK
BF 0.40 0.78 0.86
M
SK -0.176 0.223
DD
Belgium CK 0.21 0.67 0.87
BF 0.61 0.99 1.27
M 0.64
SK 0.771 0.940
DD 0.27 0.44 -0.17
Finland CK 0.13 0.23 0.28
BF
M
SK 0.248 1.01
DD
France CK
BF 0.43 0.45 0.74
M 0.81
SK 0.073 0.509
DD 0.11 0.35 0.45
Germany CK 0.37 0.87 1.00
BF 0.11 0.45 1.05
M 0.67
SK 0.217 1.008
DD 0.40 0.80 0.00
Ireland CK 0.34 1.07 1.07
BF
M
SK 0.668 0.911
DD 0.11 0.34 0.03
Italy CK 0.12 0.60 0.83
BF 0.26 0.69 1.22
M 0.54
SK 0.197 0.866
DD 0.14 0.57 0.68
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Appendix 1 - continued
The
Netherlands
CK 0.52 0.82 0.82
BF 1.08 0.96 1.08
M 1.03
SK 0.115 0.983
DD 0.71 0.97 0.24
Portugal CK 0.47 0.95 0.95
BF
M
SK 0.168 1.170
DD 0.03 0.01 -0.41
Spain CK 0.36 0.78 0.94
BF 0.00 0.30 1.17
M 0.51
SK 0.705 1.074
DD 0.36 0.73 0.40
United
Kingdom
CK 0.87 0.94 0.94
BF 1.00 1.01 1.01
M
SK 0.272 0.636
DD
Notes: CK=Cottarelli/Kourelis (1994), BF=Borio/Fritz (1995), M=Mojon (2000), SK=Sander/
Kleimeier (2001), DD=Donney/Degryse (2001); For BF and DD the 1-month response is used as
the impact multiplier; BF didn’t calculate the 3-month multiplier but the response after 1 quarter,
which is displayed instead; For DD the response after 60 month is taken as the long run multiplier;
For DD the short-run loans rate to enterprises is used.
24
Appendix 2 – Summary of pass-through regressions
country cointegration
(inclusion of
error
correction
term)
optimal lag
length (Akaike)
adj. R2 convergent
pass-through
process
mortgage lending rate
Austria no 4 0.233 yes
Belgium no 2 0.362 yes
Germany no 1 0.858 yes
Great Britain no 1 0.395 yes
Ireland no 3 0.527 yes
Italy no 1 -0.053 no
Netherlands no 1 0.574 yes
Portugal yes 6 0.184 yes
Spain no 6 0.731 yes
consumer short-term credit rate
Austria no 1 0.166 no
Belgium no 1 0.043 no
Germany yes 1 0.073 no
Great Britain no 1 0.063 no
Portugal no 1 -0.006 no
Spain yes 3 0.180 no
enterprise short-term credit rate
Austria yes 4 0.455 yes
Belgium no 1 0.595 yes
France no 1 0.315 yes
Germany yes 1 0.169 no
Netherlands no 2 0.200 yes
Portugal no 1 0.164 no
Spain no 3 0.555 yes
Ireland yes 1 0.503 yes
Italy yes 1 0.887 no
